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ExAequo et Bono: Demystifying an Ancient Concept
Leon Trakman*
"Settlement of a dispute ex aequo et bono rather than on the basis of law,
results neither from the nature of the dispute, nor from lacunae in
international law, but solely from the decision of the parties to obtain such a
solution."'

I. INTRODUCTION
The ancient concept ex aequo et bono holds that adjudicators should decide
disputes according to that which is "fair" and in "good conscience." Despite its
long history in international adjudication, and even though it is enshrined in the
Statute of the International Court of Justice, the concept of ex aequo et bono is
often avoided on grounds that it operates outside of law, or is deemed to be
contrary to law.
This Article argues that the concept has a valuable and emerging
significance in modern law. It is ideally suited to resolving disputes between
parties who are engaged in complex and long-term relationships or in emerging
fields in which the law is either inadequately developed or unsuitable to resolve
complex disputes.
The Article evaluates the negative conceptualization of ex aequo et bono. It
argues against the overly artificial divide between equitable decisions, which
accord with law, and ex aequo et bono decisions, which by inference do not.
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Tracing the evolution of the concept historically through the Medieval Law
Merchant to modern times, the Article sets out how ex aequo et bono might be
revitalized in both international and domestic law. Arguing that ex aequo et bono
operates along a continuum rather than at a fixed point between law and nonlaw, the Article illustrates how it can be both formulated and applied. The
Article demonstrates how to relate ex aequo et bono to the law of equity and how
to reconcile it with "gap filling" under law. It also shows how discretion in
applying ex aequo et bono can be subject to internal and external limits, and how
parties can invoke it most effectively to resolve their disputes. The Article
concludes by presenting a methodology by which to guide the application of ex
aequo et bono to such disputes.
Section 1Idiscusses the current status of the doctrine of ex aequo et bono. It
also considers key issues surrounding the doctrine, including the consent of the
parties to its application and the attitude of international courts and tribunals to
its ambit of operation. Section III outlines the evolution of ex aequo et bono
historically and in modern public and private international law. Section IV
evaluates the tension between equitable and ex aequo et bono decisionmaking.
Section V explores "gap filling" in the exercise of adjudicator discretion.
Sections VI and VII set out internal and external limits on ex aequo et bono.
Section VIII examines the impact of ex aequo et bono upon party autonomy.
Section IX proposes guidelines in which ex aequo et bono might operate.
The Article concludes that the viability of ex aequo et bono depends on the
confidence with which parties adopt it and how effectively and fairly
adjudicators apply it in accordance with practical reason.

II. THE STATUS OF EXAEQUO ETBONO
The concept ex aequo et bono is often negatively stereotyped, misunderstood,
or both. It is supposed that an adjudicator, by deciding according to that which
is "fair" and "good," acts "outside of the law," or more pejoratively, "acts
notwithstanding the law."' 2 It is in part for these reasons that both public and
private parties to international agreements often avoid resorting to ex aequo et
bono in resolving their differences.
The result is that, absent express party consent, decisions ordinarily are not
reached ex aequo et bono.3 In limited instances adjudicators decide cases based on
2

3

See Black's Law Dicfionagy 557 (West 6th ed 1990) (defining ex aequo et bono as "in justice and
fairness; according to what is just and good; according to equity and conscience").
For example, the International Center for the Settlement of Investment Disputes ("ICSID")
Convention on the Settlement of Investment Disputes between States and Nationals of Other
States expressly provides that tribunals that invoke ex aequo elbono in the absence of express party
consent are subject to annulment. ICSID Convention (1964), 17 UST 1270, available online at
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principles not ordinarily contained in international law, including assurances that
treatment of the parties is humane and that remedies are proportionate, but only
if such action is permitted by the applicable law. The presumption is that such
principles are legitimately invoked because they are permitted by the applicable
domestic or international legal system and are not the result of an independent
decision by the adjudicator to decide ex aequo et bono.4
Occasionally too, and invariably with the consent of the parties,
international arbitration may be decided ex aequo et bono. In effect, arbitrators
reach their decisions not on the basis of applicable law, but according to
what
5
circumstances.
the
in
conscience"
good
"in
and
"fair"
be
to
they consider
Dynamic changes in international relations, typified by the growing
international investment disputes, have brought the concept of ex aequo et bono
back into focus. 6 Parties are increasingly faced with little or no law in the
applicable field, or a situation where one or both parties mistrust the law or its
application to their particular dispute.' Coupled with this is a growing interest in
the expeditious resolution of disputes in emerging areas of law, particularly the
law as it relates to the internet, intellectual property, and state-investor disputes.
The expertise of international adjudicators may be viewed as outweighing
reliance on inapplicable law. A system which depends on conceptions of fairness
may also be considered preferable to the law of an applicable state.8 Finally,
parties engaged in a long-term relationship may be interested in resolving their

<http://wwv.worldbank.org/icsid/basicdoc/CRREnglish-final.pdf> (visited Nov 17, 2007)
("ICSID Convention"). See UN Conference on Trade and Development, Dispute Settlement: 2.6
Applicable Law, § 9 at 29, UNCTAD/EDM/Misc.232/Add.5 (2003), available online at
<http://www.unctad.org/en/docs/edmmisc232add5-en.pdf> (visited Nov 17, 2007) (discussing
how Article 42(3) of the ICSID Convention requires an explicit agreement of the parties). See also

Section V.C.
4

5

6

For a discussion on equitable decisions under law compared to ex aequo et bono outside of law, see
Section IV.
Mohsen Mohebi, The InternationalLaw Characterof the Iran-UnitedStates Claims Tribunal115 (Kluwer
1999) (citing E. Fouchard, L'Arbitrage CommercialInternationalNo.559 (1965)).
This development is also reflected in the mushrooming of investment treaties. See Taida Begic,
Applicable Law in InternationalInvestment Disputes 219-230 (Eleven Ind 2005).

7

Such "gaps" in the law are most evident in emerging areas of international practice such as
investment practice in which the pre-existing may be silent on the issue at hand. See Section V.C.

8

Considerations of fairness are also appropriate between parties of unequal bargaining power,
notably in employer-employee relations and in the award of monetary damages. See, for example,
Gilbert Castille v Commission of the European Communities, Combined Cases 173/82, 157/83, 186/84,
1986 ECR 497 (Feb 6, 1986) (where ex aequo et bono is also used in determining nonmaterial
damages due to an employee in employment cases, such as for the considerable delay that
occurred before the employee's personal file was brought up to date).
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disputes by amiable compositeu2 or ex aequo et bono in order to maintain their
ongoing association."0 Ex aequo et bono has the most to offer in respect of such
relational agreements, as distinct from discrete transactions."
The result is international organizations' mounting interest in dispute
resolution ex aequo et bono, most notably that of the International Chamber of
Commerce ("ICC"). 12 One key issue for consideration relates to how the
concept of ex aequo et bono might evolve in the future, including how it could be
constituted to suit modern international needs.
III. THE PROBLEM STATED
Parties to international law disputes-both public and commercialordinarily resolve disputes ex aequo et bono only as an exception, not as the rule.
The vast majority of decisions are resolved according to the parties' choice of
law.'3 Any resort to ex aequo et bono occurs only if the parties expressly choose it
in substitution for, or in addition to, their choice of law. 4

9

10

Amiable composition ordinarily arises when the adjudicator determines the rules governing
proceedings, rather than relying on an applicable law. On the history and institutionalization of
amiable compositeur, see Serge Braudo, L'arbitreavec mission d'amiable compositeur, 31 Euro Arb (1998),
available online at <http://interarb.com/ea/ea/ea31#2> (visited Nov 17, 2007). See also UN
Conference on Trade and Development, Dispute Settlement: 5.5 Law Governing the Merits of the
Dispute, § 2.4 at 14, UNCTAD/EDM/Misc.232/Add.40
(2005), available online at
<http://www.unctad.org/en/docs/edmmisc232add40_en.pdf> (visited Nov 17, 2007); John
E.C. Brierley, 'Equity and Good Conscience' and Amiable Composition in CanadianArbitration Law, 19
Can Bus L J 461 (1991). The terms "amiable compositeur' and "amiable composition" are used
interchangeably.
Broches, Selected Essays at 231 (cited in note 1). See also Section III.

11

"Relational" agreements, revolving around the "relationship" between the parties tend to be more

12

informal and less legalistic than discrete "transactions." See generally David Campbell, ed, The
RelationalTheory of Contract:Selected Works of Ian MacNeil257-64 (Sweet & Maxwell 2001).
The ICC appointed a Task Force on amiable composition and ex aequo et bono in September 2005 with

13

the mandate (1) "to identify the essential features of amiable composition and of ex aequo et bono" and
(2) to "study the role of the arbitrators when acting as amiable compositeurs or when deciding ex
aequo et bono, [particularly] jurisdictional, procedural, or substantive problems that may arise." The
Task Force is co-chaired by Edouard Bertrand (France) and Ronald King (United Kingdom). See
ICC, Task Force on Amiable Composition and ex aequo et bono, available online at
<http://www.iccwbo.org/policy/arbitration/id6566/index.html> (visited Nov 17, 2007). The
ICC provides for arbitration ex aequo et bono, with the consent of the parties. See ICC,
International Court Rules of Arbitration, art 17, 36 ILM 1606, 1612 (1997).
On the provision in the ICSID for the parties to make a choice of law, see Section V.C.

14

On the provision for the parties to expressly authorize the rendering of awards ex aequo et bono
under the rules of the ICC, see Aron Broches, A Convention on the Settlement of Investment Disputes
between States and Nationalsof OtherStates of 1965: Explanatory Notes and Survy of its Application, 18 YB
Comm Arb 627, 666 (1993).
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Under international law, the power of an international tribunal to decide ex
aequo et bono is restricted."5 The tribunal must have regard for "the general
principles of international law, while respecting the contractual obligations of the
parties and the final decision of international tribunals that are binding upon the
parties."' 6 According to the International Court of Justice, the choice of the
parties to
adjudicate ex aequo et bono must be expressly made and will not be
implied.'7
Critics of adjudication ex aequo et bono conceive of it as involving diplomatic
decisionmaking more fitting to a legislature than a judicial tribunal. 8 Skeptical of
judicial resort to ex aequo et bono, the late Judge Sir Hersch Lauterpacht noted that
deciding ex aequo et bono "introduces the possibility of the law being changed in
accordance with justice and political requirements."' 9
Despite its critics, decisionmaking ex aequo et bono is formally permitted in
public international law, and limitations on it are either imagined or arbitrary.
Article 38 of the Statute of the International Court of Justice ("ICJ") specifically
entitles the Court to decide cases ex aequo et bono, so long as the parties so
choose, although the Court will not invoke the doctrine itself.2 0 At the same
time, the International Court has never decided a case based on ex aequo et bono.2'
Its concern is that issues of fairness that arise outside of law ought to be
resolved in the political arena. The overriding view is that to decide ex aequo et

15

See generally Section V.B.

16

European Convention on the Peaceful Settlement of Disputes (1957), art 26, Eur Treaty Ser 23, 8

17

(1957).
On the requirement that the parties expressly so choose, see, for example, Hersch Lauterpacht,

18

The Function of Law in the InternationalCommunio 379 (Oxford 1933).
These factors account for a tendency to expressly forbid decisions ex aequo et bono. An example of

19

a decision that expressly forbids a tribunal from so acting is Burbidge, et al,Judgements UN Admin
Trib No 1311 (Nov 22, 2006) (decision forthcoming), summary available online at
<http://webfarmext.un.org/hrmtribunal/unat-review_case-digest, number.asp?ATJ-Number= 1
311> (visited Nov 17, 2007).
Lauterpacht, The Function of Law at 379 (cited in note 17).

20

On Article 38(4) of the Statute of the International Court of Justice authorizing decisions ex aequo

21

et bono "if the parties agree thereto," see the Statute of the International Court of Justice (1945),
art 38, 59 Stat 1055, 1059, available online at <http://www.icj-cij.org/documents/index.php?
p1 =4&p2=2&p3=0> (visited Nov 17, 2007). See also Thomas M. Franck, Fairnessin International
Law and Institutions 54 (Oxford 1995).
To the author's knowledge, no decision of the International Court of Justice to date has rested

22

squarely on principles of ex aequo et bono. For more on the treatment of ex aequo et bono by
international courts and tribunals, see notes 25 and 26.
See generally Karl C. Wellens, Economic Conflicts and Disputes Before the World Court (1922-1995): A
FunctionalAnaysis 270-279 (Kluwer 1996).
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bono is to diminish the standing of the Court.23 To recast itself into a conciliator
is to clothe it with powers it ought not to have.24 To replace legal principles with
open-ended conceptions of fairness is to compromise its mandate as a judicial
body. 25
For the most part, the principle of ex aequo et bono is either not mentioned
in international law decisionmaking, or it is confused with conceptions of
equity. 26 It is only expressly forbidden in a few cases, such as under the
constituent treaty of the Eritrea-Ethiopia Claims Commission.2" There is also
ample evidence that ex aequo et bono is recognized, though not as such, in
decisionmaking, both internationally under Article 38(4) of the Statute of the
International Court of Justice, and also through its accretion into multiple
domestic jurisdictions.28 International adjudicators also make painstaking efforts
to recast ex aequo et bono decisions outside of law into equitable decisions under
law. 29 The intention of those who subscribe to its spirit but not its letter is to
reach fair decisions under the law so as to avoid a non liquet, or gap in the law, or
carefully avoiding being seen to decide contra legem, contrary to the law.3

23

The view that ex aequo et bono has no application under international law was most emphatically

24

argued by the late Justice Lauterpacht. See Lauterpacht, The Function of Law at 324-28 (cited in
note 17).
See Thomas M. Franck, Recueil Des Cours: Collected Courses of the Hague Academy of InternationalLaw
199: II1, 69 (Martinus Nijhoff 1994); Wolfgang Friedmann, The North Sea ContinentalShelf CasesA Criique,64 AmJ Intl L 229, 235 (1970).

26

On the Court's avoidance of ex aequo et bono in deciding cases, see the Observation of Kellogg, J.
in Free Zones of Upper Savoy and the District of Gex (France v Switzerland), 1930 PCIJ (Set A) No 24 at
5-7, 21-22, 34-40 (Dec 6, 1930).
On the treatment of ex aequo et bono in international law and its confusion with the law of equity,

27

see Section IV. See generally Alfred P. Rubin, Secession and Self-Determination: a Legal, Moral, and
PoliticalAnalysis, 36 Stan J Intl L 253, 255 n 8 (2000); Phaedon John Kozyris, ifting the Veils of
Equity in Maritime Entitlements. Equidistancewith Proportionalioaroundthe Islands, 26 Denver J Intl L &
Poly 319, 330-31 n 38 (1998); Mark W. Janis, The Ambiguiy of Equity in International Law, 9
Brooklyn J Intl L 7 (1983).
Article 4(2) of the Algiers Peace Agreement between Ethiopia and Eritrea provides: "The

28

Commission shall not have the power to make decisions ex aequo et bono." Agreement between the
Government of the State of Eritrea and the Government of the Federal Democratic Republic of
Ethiopia (2000), art 4(2), 40 ILM 260, 261 (2001). See also Eritrea-Ethiopia Claims Commission,
42 ILM 1056, 1083 (2003). See generally M.C.W. Pinto, Structure, Process, Outcome: Thoughts on the
Essence' of InternationalArbitration,6 Leiden J Intl L 241 (1993). Pinto was the Secretary-General of
the Iran-United States Claims Tribunal.
See note 64. See also Statute of the International Court ofJustice, art 38(4) (cited in note 20).

25

29

30

On this recasting of ex aequo et bono into the law of equity, see Section V.C. For an excellent
discussion on the International Court's treatment--or nontreatment--of ex aequo et bono, see
Franck, Fairnessin InternationalLaw at 54-56 (cited in note 20).
On the different categories of equity invoked by international tribunals, see Franck, Fairness in
InternationalLawat 47-80 (cited in note 20).
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IV. EQUITY VERSUS Ex AEQuo ET BONO
A feature of both international and domestic law is the distinction that is
sometimes drawn between decisions based on the law of equity and decisions ex
aequo et bono.3' Whereas decisions in equity are deemed to be praeter legem, that is,
part of the law, decisions ex aequo et bono are imputed to an extra-legal realm.32
The rationale behind this distinction is that adjudicators may "fill gaps" in the
law based on principles of equity, but not based on notions of fairness that are
not reduced to legal principles and rules of law. Whereas equity is part of an
applicable legal system, notions of equality associated with ex aequo et bono are
deemed to reside in a moral, social, or political realm that is external to the law.33
Those who support the distinction between decisions in equity and
decisions ex aequo et bono treat equitable decisionmaking as part of international
34
or domestic law with its own body of rights and duties and legal relationships.
They differentiate this body of equitable law from the nonlegal relationships they
associate with ex aequo et bono adjudication. 3' As the late Justice Lauterpacht of
the ICJ asserted: "adjudication ex aequo et bono amounts to an avowed creation of
new relations between the parties., 3' As such, "it differs clearly from the
application of the rules of equity" and "form[s] part of international law as
indeed, of any legal system. ' '37 Lauterpacht's assumption was that tribunals that
decide ex aequo et bono create new relationships outside the law, and in doing so,
are not constrained by existing legal rights and duties."
Despite the distinction between equitable and ex aequo et bono decisions,
legal commentators disagree on the nature of the distinction. For some like
31
32
33

See id at 47-80.
This distinction is also made in investment disputes, the most fertile field of ex aequo et bono
decisionmaking. See Section V.C.
On the relationship between decisionmaking in accordance with the law and ex aequo et bono
relating to recovering lost profits, see John Y. Gotanda, Recovering Lost Profits in International
Diiputes, Georgetown J Ind L 61, 108-109 (2004).

34

See, for example, the request by the Australian government for ex aequo et bono proceedings in
order to "create new rights" in its trade dispute with the United States. World Trade
Organization, Second Submission of Australia Regarding the Continued Dumping and Offset Act of 2000,
11(3) (Feb 27, 2002), available online at <http://www.dfat.gov.au/trade/negotiations/
disputes/217_Australia rebuttal submission.html#_ftn3> (visited Nov 17, 2007).

35

See for example, Friedmann, 64 Am J Intl L at 229 (cited in note 24). For a view that the Modern
Law Merchant is administered ex aequo et bono, quite apart from the law, see Klaus Peter Berger,
InternationalArbitral Practiceand the UNIDROIT Prindples of InternationalCommercial Contracts, 46 Am
J Compar L 129 (1998).
Hersch Lauterpacht, The Development of InternationalLaw by the InternationalCourt 217 (Steven 1958).

36
37
38

Id.
See id. See also Begic, Applicable Law at 228-230 (cited in note 6).
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Judge Lauterpacht, decisions in equity and decisions ex aequo et bono are quite
distinct.39 As the International Court of Justice pronounced in the Fisheries
Jurisdiclion case, equitable decisionmaking "is not a matter of finding simply an
' 40
equitable solution, but an equitable solution derived from the applicable law. 42
For others, 41 the words "equity" and "ex aequo et bond' are used interchangeably.
For yet others, the wide latitude accorded to adjudicators to decide ex aequo et
bono is an integral43 part of the discretion which common law judges exercise as a
matter of equity.
Structural distinctions between equitable and ex aequo et bono
decisionmaking are overstated, however. The demarcation between equitable
discretion in law and discretion unrestrained by law is often difficult to draw.
What differentiates them is primarily the pronouncement or inference by
adjudicators themselves that they are making decisions according to law or ex
aequo et bono, whether or not they are doing so in fact. Those who insist on a
strict division between equity within the law and fairness outside the law achieve
structural symmetry at the expense of the substantive ends which both
conceptions of equity under law and fairness outside law share. Those shared
ends include arriving at fair results suited to each case. If ex aequo et bono
decisions are directed at redressing injustice, then surely they should embody
comparable ends to those sought through the law of equity.
At most, "gap filling" under the law of equity and decisions ex aequo et bono
that are directed at fairness between the parties operate at different stages along
the same continuum. There is no strict divide between the two." It follows that
39

See Lauterpacht, The Function of Law (cited in note 17).

40
41

See FisheriesJurisdiction (United Kingdom v Iceland), 1974 ICJ 33, 78 (July 25, 1974).
See, for example, Mohsen Mohebi, The InternationalLaw Character of the Iran-UnitedStates Claims

42

Tribunal 116 (Kluwer 1999) (on this conflation between ex aequo et bono and equity).
See, for example, International Law Commission, Summagy Record of the 442nd Meeting, [1958] 1 YB
Intl L Commn 51, 39, UN Doc A/CN.4/SR.442, available online at <http://untreaty.un.org/
ilc/documentation/english/a.cn4_sr442.pdf> (visited Nov 17, 2007).

43

On this comparability between equity and ex aequo et bono in relation to international arbitration in
particular, see, for example, Mandfred Lachs, Equity in Arbitration and in Judicial Settlement of
Disputes, 6 Leiden J Ind L 323, reprinted in Sam Muller and Wim Mijs, eds, The Flame Rekindled,
New Hopes for InternationalArbitration 125 (Martinus Nijhoff 1993). But see Edward McWhinney,
InternationalArbitraland JudicialProcesses, and the Atrophy of the Permanent Court of Arbitration 577-85
(Helbing & Lichtenhahn 1993).

44

See Franck, Fairnessin InternationalLaw at 47-80 (cited in note 20). Franck identifies at least three
different conceptions of equity: "Corrective equity," "broadly conceived equity," and "common
heritage equity." "Corrective equity" is identified with procedural fairness, consisting of "broadly
conceived equity" that is expressed in some rules of the 1982 UN Convention on the Law of the
Sea and in the impending rules on the Non-Navigational Uses of Watercourses. Franck identifies
the "common heritage equity" over natural resources with the patrimony of humanity, as is
exemplified by a common heritage interest in the deep sea bed, the moon, and Antarctica.
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the issue is less whether adjudicative discretion is grounded formally in equity or
ex aequo et bono, but in how adjudicators employ it to decide particular cases. Of
concern is not whether adjudicators are claiming to "fill gaps" in the law avoid a
non liquet, or act outside of the law, but how they employ their discretion in fact
and whether the exercise of that discretion accords with practical reason."
V. Ex AEQUO ET BONO DECISIONS IN ACTION
This Section explores the use of ex aequo et bono in historical and
conventional trade and investment practice, first in light of the Medieval Law
Merchant and then under the modern law of international trade and investment.
It argues that medieval merchant courts-rough precursors to modern
international commercial arbitrators-decided disputes ex aequo et bono in
response to "the law" of commercial practice, quite apart from "the law" of
princes.46 Particular emphasis is given to the application of ex aequo et bono to
international trade disputes through the United Nations Commission on
International Trade Law ("UNCITRAL") 47 and to the settlement of investorstate disputes through the International Center for the Settlement of Investment
Disputes ("ICSID").48 Central to the discussion of ex aequo et bono decisions is the
paramount interest of the parties in resolving disputes expertly, informally,
expeditiously, and fairly, rather than according to formal law.49
A. THE MEDIEVAL LAW MERCHANT
Merchant judges under the Medieval Law Merchant decided cases ex aequo
et bono according to merchant codes devised, adopted, and applied by merchant
judges.5 ° These merchant judges resolved disputes among itinerant merchants at
regional fairs, markets, towns, and ports--outside the jurisdiction of courts and
judges who administered the law of local princes.51 Against this background,
merchant judges decided disputes ex aequo et bono, encompassing "fairness
between the parties" and the prompt dispensation of justice.52 The rationale

45

46

On the internal and external limits imposed upon the exercise of discretion ex aequo et bono, see
Sections VI and VII.
On the law of princes in medieval times and prior to the creation of the nation state, see Leon E.
Trakman, The Law Merchant 7-17 (Rothman 1983).

47

On the UNCITRAL, see Section V.B.

48
49

On the ICSID, see Section V.C.
For a discussion of these paramount interests of the parties, see Section IX.

50

See Leon E. Trakman, The Law Merchant: The Evolution of the CommercialLaw 7-21 (Rothman 1981).

51

Id.
Id at 12.

52
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behind this process of reaching decisions was that itinerant merchants who
traveled with their goods from guild to guild, fair to fair, and port to port should
receive an expeditious remedy before a merchant court without having to delay
their mercantile journey.53 So significant was this interest in expedited
resolutions of disputes that Medieval Law Merchant courts in parts of what are
now France were named piepowder or "dusty feet" courts, presumably obligated
to provide remedies before the merchant parties could shake the dust off their
4
feet.
In essence, the purpose of ex aequo et bono decisionmaking was to use an
informal, time- and cost-effective process so as to arrive at results that were
"fair" to the parties, not according to the law of the land but in light of merchant
usages and party practice.55 Merchant judges decided cases on the basis of a
combination of merchant codes and merchant practice. For example, they
decided disputes over the "just price" in light of merchant codes and merchant
practices that redressed usurious transactions while also preserving an
uninterrupted flow of goods.5 6 In dispensing merchant remedies, they provided a
balance between expedient and fair results by which merchants could continue
their business activities with minimal disruption.
Far from relying on an abstract conception of "the good," the virtue of the
Law Merchant resided in the fact that it was devised by merchants in response to
the expectations of merchants. The process of ex aequo et bono decisionmaking
was intended to be market sensitive, informal, and responsive to the dynamics of
the particular trade, region, and parties.57 Decisions ex aequo et bono were not to
be guided by the naked discretion of merchant judges nor by their personal
sense of fair play, decency, or expediency. They were to be grounded in the
tenets of mercantile fairness, developed according to the manner in which
merchants conducted trade, and responsive to trading relations among merchant
parties. Cosmopolitan in nature and adaptable in operation, the Law Merchant
was meant to transcend
the law of local princes, while studiously trying to avoid
58
conflicting with it.

53
54

Id at 16.
Id at 13, 17.

55

Id at 33.
On the "just price" doctrine in the Medieval Law Merchant, see id at 8.

56
57

See id at 7-21. See also Leon E. Trakman, From the Law Merchantto E-Merchant Law, 53 U Toronto
L J 369 (2003).

58

See Trakman, The Law Merchant at 8-10 (cited in note 50).
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However imperfect the Medieval Law Merchant may have been, 9 accusing
its merchant judges of lawlessness in deciding disputes ex aequo et bono is unduly
harsh. Whether merchant decisions are viewed as based on a pre-existing "law"
embodied in merchant codes or whether they evolved more directly out of
merchant practice depends on how merchant "law" was conceived in medieval
times. If merchant decisions were deemed to have derived from merchant codes,
then medieval merchant judges decided cases according to merchant "law." If
decisions were viewed as evolving out of continually changing merchant
practice, then merchant judges conceivably exercised discretion beyond these
codes of merchant law. However, in neither case did merchant judges exercise
unchecked discretion. Their discretion was circumscribed by the requirement
that they apply mercantile custom, usage, and practice as distinct from deciding
on the basis of unbridled discretion.6 °
B. THE UNCITRAL
The conception of ex aequo et bono has also evolved into the so-called
Modern Law Merchant.61 Most notable among these is the provision for ex aequo
et bono decisionmaking in the UNCITRAL Arbitration Rules. Article 33 of the
Arbitration Rules states:
(1) The arbitral tribunal shall apply the law designated by the parties as
applicable to the substance of the dispute. Failing such designation by the
parties, the arbitral tribunal shall apply the law determined by the conflict of
laws rules which it considers applicable.
(2) The arbitral tribunal shall decide as amiable compositeur or ex aequo et bono

only if the parties have expressly authorised the arbitral tribunal to do so
and if the law applicable to the arbitral procedure permits such arbitration.
(3) In all cases, the arbitral tribunal shall decide in accordance with the terms
of the contract and62 shall take into account the usages of the trade applicable
to the transaction.
Article 33(2) epitomizes the ambivalence towards ex aequo et bono. Arbitral
tribunals can decide cases ex aequo et bono, not because of the inherent virtue of
resorting to such a process of decisionmaking, but because the parties have
expressly adopted it. Article 33 of the UNCITRAL Arbitration Rules is widely

59

On these imperfections, see id; Trakman, From the Law Merchant to E-Merchant Law (cited in note

57).
60

See Trakman, The Law Merchant at 8-9 (cited in note 50).

61

See id at 23-37.

62

United Nations Commission on International Trade Law Arbitration Rules, art 33, General
Assembly Res No 31/98, UN Doc A/RES/31/98 (1976), available online at
(visited Nov
<http://www.uncitral.org/pdf/english/texts/arbitration/arb-rules/arb-rules.pdf>
17, 2007) ("UNCITRAL Arbitration Rules").
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known and its implications are well-understood in ex aequo et bono
decisionmaking.6 3 Its enactment has influenced national and state legal systems
that have provided for decisions ex aequo et bono in their commercial codes,
model laws,64 and judicial decisions.65 Despite its influence, however, there is
limited evidence of adjudication that relies extensively on the UNCITRAL
model of ex aequo et bono decisionmaking.66

63

64

65

66

See, for example, United Nations General Assembly, Settlement of Commercial Disputes:
Revision of the UNCITRAL Arbitration Rules (2006), 9 A/CN.9/WG.IJ/WP.143/Add.1 (2006).
See also UNCITRAL, Dispute Settlement: 5.5, § 2.4 at 14 (cited in note 9); Brierley, Equio and Good
Conscience, 19 Can Bus L J at 461 (cited in note 9); Isaak Ismail Dore, Arbitration and Conciliation
under the Undtral Rules: A TextualAnaysis (Martinus Nijhoff 1986).
See, for example, UNCITRAL Arbitration Rules, art 33 (cited in note 63). A number of national
and state legal and especially arbitration systems also expressly provide for deciding cases ex aequo
et bono. See, for example, InternationalArbitration Rules of Zurich Chamber of Commerce (1989), art 5,
available online at <http://www.jurisint.org/doc/htrnl/reg/en/2000/2000jiregen32.html>
(visited Nov 17, 2007); Model Clause: The Chamber of National and InternationalArbitration of Milan, cl
2, available online at <http://www.jurisint.org/doc/html/cla/en/2005/2005jiclaenl2.html>
(visited Nov 17, 2007); Commonwealth Consolidated Acts, The InternationalArbitration Act of 1974,
available online at <http://www.austlii.edu.au/au/legis/ cth/consol-act/iaa1974276/> (visited
Nov 17, 2007); Malta Arbitration Centre, Malta's Model Arbitration Clause, available online at
<http://www.mac.com.mt/documents/model arbitration_ clauses.pdf> (visited Nov 17, 2007)
(stating in clause (g) that "the arbitrator shall decide ex aequo et bono"). El Salvador's
Commercial Code provides in Article 67:
Should the partners decide not to follow the normal judicial process, they shall
stipulate in the articles of incorporation whether the arbitrators settling the
disputes are dejure or ex aequo et bono and make the respective appointments. If
the above provision is not in the instrument, it shall be understood that the
partners shall opt for a ruling by two ex aequo et bono arbitrators."
See Free Trade Area of the Americas, Negotiating Group on Settlement, El SalvadoraQuestionnaire,
available online at <http://www.ftaa-alca.org/busfac/comarb/ElSalvador/quesesve.asp>
(visited Nov 17, 2007). On the use of ex aequo et bono in arbitration in Brazil, see Chamber of
Mediation and Arbitration of Sao Paulo, Arbitration Rules, art 3, available online at
<http://www.camaradearbitragemsp.org.br/ingles/documentos/arbitration-rules.pdf>
(visited
Nov 17, 2007). On the right of parties to appoint an arbitrator to decide ex aequo et bono in Chile,
see Form Arbitration Clause For an Arbitrator Ex Aequo Et Bono, available online at
<http://www.camsantiago.com/html/english/html/left/clausulas/l.htm>
(visited Nov 17,
2007).
Typifying the application of ex aequo et bono in the law of restitution, see Lord Mansfield in Moses v
Mac/erlan, 97 Eng Rep 676, 680 (1760) (stating that an action in restitution lies "for money which
ex aequo et bono the defendant ought to refund").
Nevertheless, Rule 33(2) of the UNCITRAL Model Law has served as a template for adopting
comparable provisions in both international and domestic law. See European Convention on
International Commercial Arbitration (1961), art VII(2), 484 UN Treaty Ser 364, 374 (19631964). See also Rules of Procedure of the Inter-American Commercial Arbitration Commission,
art 30 (2), 2 International Handbook on CommercialArbitration, Inter-American Arbitration, Annex II at
10 (Kluwer 2002). On the adoption of ex aequo et bono in domestic legal systems, see note 64.
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C. INVESTMENT DISPUTES

The case for deciding cases ex aequo et bono is especially palpable in complex
investment disputes between private investors and states. New issues not
anticipated at the time of concluding an investor-state agreement sometimes
arise when reliance on the terms of that agreement may be unsatisfactory, when
the agreement is unlikely to be modified, and when submitting an intervening
dispute to arbitration ex aequo et bono may avoid having to rely on the law of the
investor state. Such investment situations typify situations between investor-state
in which the ex aequo et bono resolution
parties involved in ongoing relationships
67

of disputes may be most fitting.
A provision for deciding state-investor disputes ex aequo et bono is contained
in the Convention on the Settlement of Investment Disputes between States and
Nationals of Other States ("ICSID Convention"). 68 Article 42(3) of the ICSID,
consistent with Article 38(4) of the Statute of the International Court of
Justice, 69 authorizes "any Arbitral Tribunal" to decide ex aequo et bono with the
consent of the parties. 70 The parties may presumably also request that the
arbitrator act as an amiable compositeur, in which case the arbitrator may invoke
Article 42(3) "to decide a dispute ex aequo et bono if the parties so agree."71 The
parties may also have resort to dgpefage in resolving different issues according to
different laws.72
Reaching a decision ex aequo et bono under the ICSID Convention does not
preclude the arbitral tribunal from applying an applicable law. The ICSID still
provides the parties with a choice of law that is binding on the ICSID arbitrator.
However, the parties remain free to authorize the resolution of their disputes in
67

On such relational agreements, see note 11.

See generally Christoph H. Schreuer, The ICSID Convention: A Commentagy (Cambridge 2000).
On Article 38(4) of the Statute of the ICJ, see text accompanying note 20.
70 See ICSID Convention, art 42(3) (cited in note 3). See Atlantic Triton Co Ltd v People's Revolutionary
Republic of Guinea, JCSID Case No ARB/84/1, Award of April 21, 1986, 1, 3 ICSID Rep 13, 17
(1995) (where it was specifically stated that "the disagreement shall be settled ex aequo et bono in
accordance with the provisions of Article 42(3) of the [ICSID] Convention").
71 ICSID Convention, art 42(3) (cited in note 3). This resort to Article 42(3) is a reasonable
interpretation in light of the ICSID Convention, notably Article 25(1). Id, art 25(1). Article 23 of
the Report of the Executive Directors of the Convention provides that "[c]onsent of the parties is the
cornerstone of the jurisdiction of the Centre. Consent to jurisdiction must be in writing and once
given cannot be withdrawn unilaterally (Article 25(1))." International Bank for Reconstruction
and Development, Report of the Executive Directors on the Convention on the Settlement of Investment
Disputes between States and Nationals of Other States, art 23 (1965), available online at
<http://icsid.worldbank.org/ICSID/StaticFles/basicdoc/partA.htm> (visited Nov 17, 2007).
72 Depefage in private international law refers to cases in which different issues in the same case are
governed by the laws of different states. See Begic, Applicable Law at 155-164 (cited in note 6)
(discussing the use of dcpefage under the ICSID in relation to state-investor disputes).
68
69
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whole or in part ex aequo et bono through the initial or a supervening agreement,
which can be reached during the course of arbitral proceedings.7 3 They may also
limit ex aequo et bono decisionmaking in accordance with a binding treaty or other
agreement.74
A few ICSID decisions illustrate the resort to ex aequo et bono in stateinvestor practice. In Agp v Congo, the Congolese Government proposed in its
75
Counter-Memorial that the Tribunal should act as informal amiable compositeur.
Agip did not agree. 76 As a result, the Tribunal considered itself bound to decide
in accordance with the applicable law and not as an amiable compositeur.77
In Benvenuti v Congo, 78 a case in which the parties did not make a choice of
law, the Tribunal decided ex aequo et bono. There, the Claimant proposed in the
course of arbitration proceedings that the Tribunal decide ex aequo et bono, which
the Respondent rejected. 79 During arbitration the parties agreed to negotiate a
settlement by amiable comositeur, and failing such agreement, to authorize the
Tribunal "to render its award as quickly as possible by judgment ex aequo et
bono.' ' 80 After negotiations failed, the Tribunal applied Article 42(3) of the ICSID
Convention and decided the arbitration ex aequo et bono.8'
Controversial here is whether an ex aequo et bono decision can be reached in
the absence of party consent under the ICSID. The answer is that the agreement
of the parties is required at the commencement or during the course of
proceedings in order for ICSID arbitrators to entertain decisions ex aequo et bono.
Arbitrators who decide ex aequo et bono in the absence of express party consent
risk being accused of exceeding their jurisdiction and having their awards
annulled.82

73

On the express authorization of the parties for an ICSID tribunal to decide ex aequo et bono, see
Begic, Applicable Law at 222-26 (cited in note 6).

74

This is inferred by reading together ICSID Article 42(1), entitling the parties to choose the
applicable rules of law, with ICSID Article 42(3), entitling the parties to consent to an award ex
aequo et bono. ICSID Convention, arts 42(1), 42(3) (cited in note 3).

75

AGIP S.p-A. v People's Republic of the Congo (1979), 21 ILMv 726 (1982).

76

Id.

77

Id at 318.
Benvenuti and Bonfant Srl v People's Republic of the Congo, ICSID Case No ARB/77/2, Award of Aug

78

8, 1980, 1 ICSID Rep 330 (1993).

80

Id at 338-342. The Claimant made the proposal at the first session of the hearing on June 14-15,
1978, but was rejected by the Respondent; an agreement was formally reached by the Parties on
June 5, 1979 and communicated to the Tribunal. Id at 342.
Id at 342.

81

Id at 349.

82

See generally Broches, A Convention on the Settlement of Investment Disputes between States and Nationals

79

of OtherStates of 1965 at 666 (cited in note 14). See, for example, Andrea Giardina, A Sef-Contained,
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Finally, the separation between equitable and ex aequo et bono decisions is
doubtful under the ICSID. For example, the authority of adjudicators to
intertwine an applicable law with an ex aequo et bono decision is implicit when
reading Article 42(1) of the ICSID Convention together with Article 42(3).83
Even when the parties grant adjudicators the authority to decide ex aequo et bono,
such as under Article 42(1) of the 1CSID Convention, the arbitral award that
results sometimes embodies an amorphous mixture of equity under law and
discretion beyond law.84
VI. GAP FILLING
Given this role ex aequo et bono plays in dispute resolution, a formal
distinction exists between "gap filling" in law and deciding cases ex aequo et bono.
An adjudicator who "fills gaps" in the law acts in terms of the law. An
adjudicator who decides ex aequo et bono does not "fill a gap," but engages in
action unrelated to law. Illustrated in relation to investor-state disputes under the
1CSID, "the function of filling lacunae [gaps] is different from the application of
equity under Article 42(3). '8
The notion that discretion that does not "fill gaps" in the law is thus
outside of law is based on several assumptions. The first is that adjudicators who
decide ex aequo et bono may exercise discretion based on objective conceptions of
fairness such as those embodied in trade practice or upon their own subjective
views. The second is that, in both cases, adjudicators may not be acting in terms
of the law. The third is that these adjudicators may be challenged for not
complying with the law in so deciding. 6 A possible inference is that, in
Non-NationalReview System, in Richard B. Lilich and Charles N. Brower, eds, InternationalArbitration
in the Twenqy First Century: Towards 'Judicialization" and Uniformity" 199, 199-212 (Transnational
1993). See also Klo'ckner Industrie-Anlagen GmbH and Others v. United Republic of Cameroon and Son/ti
Camerounaisedes Engrais,2 ICSID Reports 3, 59 (1983).
83
Article 42(1) of the Convention provides that a Tribunal shall decide a dispute in accordance with
such rules of law as may be agreed by the parties. ICSID Convention, art 42(1) (cited in note 3).
The parties are free to agree on rules of law defined as they choose. Id. They may refer to a
national law, international law, a combination of national and international law, or a law frozen in
time or subject to specified modifications. On art 42(3), see note 3. For a commentary on the
ICSID Convention, see Schreuer, The ICSID Convention (cited in note 68). For a repository of
ICSID documents at the World Bank, see ICSID Conventions, Regulations, and Rules, available online
at <http://www.worldbank.org/icsid/basicdoc/basicdoc.htm> (visited Nov 17, 2007).
84 See, for example, Benvenuti & Bonfant Sr/ v People's Republic of the Congo at 338-342 (cited in note 78).
85 The use of the word "equitable" in Section 9 is intended to refer to decisions ex aequo et bono, as
distinguished from the law of equity. See UNCTAD, Dispute Settlement: 2.6 at § 9 (cited in note 3).
86 See Carlos Garcia Bauer, La Controversia sobre el Teritorio de Be/icey el ProcedimientoEx-aequo et Bono,
54 Am J Intl L 205, 205 (1960) (arguing that the purpose of ex aequo et bono is not to fill gaps in the
law; ex aequo et bono is not employed in order to avoid a situation where there is no applicable law).
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exercising discretion in87this manner, they may be acting not only outside the law,
but also contrary to it.
This inference is debatable. As a preliminary matter, whether or not an
adjudicator exercises discretion that is deemed to "fill gaps" in the law in the
interests of justice or arrives at a fair result outside of the law, the exercise of
discretion in both cases is ordinarily motivated by comparable ends: to treat the
parties evenhandedly and to arrive at a just decision.88
As a practical matter, the demarcation between discretion in accordance
with law or outside law ignores the continuum along which discretion is
exercised in fact. The key issue is not to establish that exact point at which an
adjudicator "fills gaps" in the law or acts outside it. Rather, the overriding
purpose is to determine when, why, and how that adjudicator exercises
discretion. That determination is established in light of the nature of the
discretion exercised, the context in which it is applied, and its impact on party
relations.89 Nor does the stage at which that discretion is deemed to be excessive
reside at an exact point between equity in law and ex aequo et bono, but instead
operates along a variable continuum.9 °
Only at the polar extremes of that continuum can it be said that the
exercise of discretion may be in accordance with or outside the law. For
example, discretion that clarifies a simple ambiguity in a statute or regulation is
likely to comport with law. A discretion that is invoked to protect a party's
interest, which is not protected by a legal right, such as a party's moral interest in
preserving the environment, may arise outside the law.9' Most cases do not lie at
either extreme, and it is in relation to most cases that the division between "gap
filling" under law and discretion outside of law is most doubtful.9 2
Operating along a spectrum of discretion does not render decisions ex
aequo et bono contrary to law. Instead it reaffirms the application of law according
to the values that are ascribed to party practices and to the customs surrounding
those practices. It ensures the co-existence, not the antipathy, between the strict
application of law and the functioning of discretion beyond it. It also transcends
87

This restriction on adjudicative discretion is sometimes inferred from Article 42(3) of the ISCID

88

Convention. See Section V.C.
See Section VIII.

90

See Sections V and IX.
On the relationship between legal culture and discretion in decisionmaking in international

91

commercial arbitration in particular, see Leon E. Trakman, Legal Traditions and International
CommerdalArbitration,17 Am Rev Ind Arb 1, 41-43 (2007).
On the exercise of judicial discretion in relation to interests in the environment that are not

92

protected by legal rights, see Leon E. Trakman and Sean Gatien, Rights and Responsibiliies, 215-276
(Toronto 1999).
See Section IX.

89

Vol. 8 No. 2

Ex Aequo et Bono: Demystifying an Andent Concept

Trakman

the distinction between "gap 93filling" to avoid a non liquet and adjudicative
discretion to avoid an injustice.

VII. EXTERNAL LIMITS ON ExAEQUO ET BONO
When has an adjudicator engaged in the unreasonable exercise of
discretion ex aequo et bono? Alternatively phrased, when has an adjudicator moved
so far along the spectrum as to have crossed the boundary between a practically
reasonable and an unreasonable use of discretion?
The rationale that the power to decide ex aequo et bono somehow permits
adjudicators to decide wholly at will flies in the face of practical reasonableness
in decisionmaking.9 4 Determining when discretion ex aequo et bono is excessive
depends on a functional test that subjects discretion to external and internal
limits that are grounded in practical reason."
External limits are imposed on discretion as a matter of construction in the
context in which that discretion is exercised, and not a priori as a principle of
law. 96 At its narrowest, that limit requires that attention be given to the practices
of the parties. At its broadest, it anticipates consideration of the analogous
practices of others that have crystallized into common usages, shared habits, and
emerging customs. Article 33(3) of the UNCITRAL Arbitration Rules provides
as much in stipulating of ex aequo et bono that: "in all cases, the arbitral tribunal
shall decide in accordance with the terms of the contract and shall take into account
the usages of the trade applicableto the transaction.97
Grounded in natural law, the principle of practical reason imputes to
decisionmakers the ability to differentiate between rational and irrational action,
free will, and coercion.9 8 If the adjudicative decision is to be "fair," it must be
fair against the background of rational actors exercising their free will. If it is to
be practically reasonable, it must be reasonable in light of a natural conception

93
94
95
96

97
98

Law is conceived of as "complete" or as having a "non liquet," namely, as being incomplete. See
Lauterpacht, The Funtion of Law at 63-64 (cited in note 17).
This is apparent on an examination of cases in which ex aequo et bono arises, such as under the
ICSID. See, for example, the Congo cases discussed in notes 75-81.
See also Sections V, VI.
On the rationale that ex aequo etbono discretion is more fitting in relational agreements than
discrete transactions, see note 11.
See UNCITRAL Arbitration Rules, art 33(3) (emphasis added) (cited in note 62).
On the attributes of rationality and free action that is imputed to practical reason in the "new
classical theory" of natural law, see Robert P. George, In Defence of NaturalLaw (Clarendon 1999).
See also Germaln Grisez, The First Prindpl of Practical Reason: A Commentary on the Summa
Theologiae 1-2,Quesion 94,Article 2, 10 Natural L F 168, 196 (1995).

Winter 2008

ChicagoJournalof InternationalLaw

of rights that guides decisionmaking,9 9 not because of the wholly personal
conceptions of fairness of whosoever happens to be the adjudicator. 100
VIII. INTERNAL LIMITS ON EXAEQUO ET BONO
The exercise of discretion is also circumscribed by internal limits. 10'
Adjudicators are subject to internal rules that require them to reach decisions
through a process of reason that is "fair" and guided by "good conscience. ,,1112
Like external limits, internal limits are grounded in practical reason. Those
internal limits on discretion are set by intelligent human subjects exercising free
will who decide according to reasons that are based on morality.'0 3 Such internal
limits on discretion arise, for example, when judges impose penalties, not
according to their subjective values, but based on higher moral
precepts by
10 4
which they determine the nature and limits of "fair" punishment.
Precepts of due process of law embodying natural law values may serve as
internal limits upon ex aequo et bono decisions, such as when they base a party's
right to be heard on a moral foundation. However, internal limits set on the
exercise of discretion ex aequo et bono are also distinguishable from due process.
In particular, the process of deciding ex aequo et bono is grounded in notions of
fairness that are not necessarily attributable to law.'
This natural conception of rights is grounded in a "new classical theory" of natural law. See
George, In Defence of NaturalLaw at 231-234 (cited in note 98); Grisez, 10 Natural L F at 168-201
(cited in note 98). But see Russell Hittinger, A Critique of the New NaturalLaw Theory (Notre Dame
1987). On the expression of this natural conception through practical reason, see further Section
VIII.
100 There is ample authority that international commercial arbitrators who are expressly authorized by
99

the parties to decide as amiable compositeurs or ex aequo et bono do so on the basis of international
commercial custom and usage, as distinct from principles of law. See, for example, Berthold
Goldman, La Lex Mercatoria dans les Contrats et L'arbitrageInternationaux: Ritit et Perspectives [Lex
Mercatoria in International Contracts and Arbitration: Reality and Prospect], 1979 J du droit
international 1; Eric Loquin, L'Amiable Composition en Droit Compari et International (Librairies
Techniques 1980). See also Section IX.
101 See Section VII.
102
It is arguable, but not self-evident, that the UNCITRAL Arbitration Rules, art 33 (cited in note
62) anticipates such internal rules to govern the process of decisionmaking ex aequo et bono. See
Section IX.
103
On the identification between practical reason and the actions of intelligent human subjects

104

exercising free will, see Russell Hittinger, A Critique of the New NaturalLaw Theory (cited in note
99); George, In Defence of NaturalLaw (cited in note 98).
On guidelines in determining that which is excessive, see Section IX.

105 It is understandably difficult to arrive at internal rules by which to measure concepts like fairness

and good conscience. However, it is equally difficult to arrive at internal rules to govern "the rule
of law," "natural justice," and "due process of law." For a preliminary discussion of the internal
rules of ex aequo et bono arbitration, see J. Brian Casey, Arbitration Law of Canada: Practice and
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Ultimately, internal limits upon discretion ex aequo et bono depend on the
application of practical reason to human subjects rather than resort to analytical
deduction from strict legal principles.'0 6 No matter how informal and
expeditious that application of practical reason may be, adjudicative proceedings
should also be transparent and applied evenhandedly to the parties."°7
IX. ESTABLISHING GROUND RULES
However much ex aequo et bono is rationalized along a spectrum of
discretion and is subject to internal and external limits, adjudicators can only act
ex aequo et bono if they enjoy the confidence of those who are the subject of their
decisions. The parties need to know, not only that internal and external limits
can be placed on adjudicative discretion, but also that adjudicators will apply
those limits.'0 8
A problem that must be faced is that even parties who favor ex aequo et bono
decisionmaking may choose that adjudication process in only broad terms,
without providing the particular means by which adjudicators are to decide a
dispute. 0 9 This raises the question as to whether and how parties can be helped,
not only to refine ex aequo et bono clauses in their agreements, but also to
appreciate more fully how such recourse may benefit them. Part of the solution
is to develop a coherent conception of an ex aequo et bono method of deciding
cases that earns the respect of those who ultimately are free to choose whether
and how to adopt it.
Parties also need to have reasons for resorting to ex aequo et bono
decisionmaking more viable than their trust in adjudicative discretion or even
their wish to avoid the vagaries of an applicable law. They need to know that the
adjudicator will pay due regard to their particular relationships and will reach a

Procedure § 1.3.6 (Juris 2005); Christopher Liebscher and Alice Fremuth-Wolf, eds, Arbitration Law
and Practicein Centraland Eastern Europe § 6.7 (unis 2006).
106 For a thoughtful analysis of the distinction between the natural law roots of practical reason and
the grounding of legal reasoning in analytical legal positivism, see Stephen Hall, The Persistent
Spectre: Natural Law, InternationalLaw and the Limits of Legal Posiivism, 12 European J Intl L 261,
278-81 (2001).
107 This relationship between practical reason and deciding in accordance with that which is "fair and
right" goes to the very roots of ex aequo et bono. See Section I.
108 This is consistent with the fact that the parties are free to choose decisionmaking ex aequo et bono,
and would ordinarily be disinclined to choose it if it is perceived as giving rise to unbridled
adjudicative discretion.
109 The words used to empower adjudicators to decide ex aequo et bono ordinarily state only that the
parties can authorize such action, and on occasions, that the adjudicator can so decide when the
applicable law permits it. See Section III.
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determination that is practically reasonable.1 " They should recognize when an ex
aequo et bono decision best suits their particular ends, as when it can operate
informally, expeditiously, and guided by a sense of fair play. Parties also need to
feel comfortable that both the adjudicative process and the result reached can
preserve their long-term relationship on the one hand, yet be enforceable on the
other."'
In addition, adjudicators should be cautious not to overreacb in the
exercise of discretion, given the risk of having their decisions nullified on
grounds of having acted ultra vires. As is apparent from Article 33(2) of the
UNCITRAL Arbitration Rules, adjudicators may decide ex aequo et bono only if
the parties have expressly so agreed and only if that recourse is permitted by the
n2
applicable law.
Ultimately, the viability of ex aequo et bono decisions resides in the capacity
of adjudicators to adhere to processes that respond to practical sensibility, rather
than to formal rules of law.
X. GUIDELINES IN APPLYING EXAEQUO ET BONO
Guiding the application of ex aequo et bono decisionmaking are the needs: (1)
to evaluate it in light of each relational context and not in the abstract; (2) to
encompass within it "fairness" between the parties in their circumstances; (3) to
embody in relation to the parties an assessment of the wider context of
conventions, customs, and usages, including legal usages that impinge upon the
practices of those parties; (4) to engage in an expeditious process of
decisionmaking; (5) to arrive at results that are transparent and evenhanded in
their treatment of the parties; and (6) to so decide according to a moral order
that is expressed through practical reason."'
Far from being wholly arbitrary, the foundations of ex aequo et bono are
situated in functional processes that are directed at resolving realistic, but often
complex, problems. The decisionmaker is neither bound to apply nor to
disregard the law as a matter of principle, but to exercise discriminating
judgment on the practical and moral reasons by which to decide each case.
Those reasons may reflect specific patterns of fact, identifiable party practices,
and applicable customs and usages that may inform the moral basis of the

110 See Sections IV-V.
III
112

This is particularly so in relation to investor-state disputes under the ICSID. See Section V.C.
See Section IV.B; UNCITRAL Arbitration Rules, art 33 (cited in note 62).

113 See Section VII.
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decision)' 4 The practical reasons that guide decisions ex aequo et bono may also
justify adopting alternative processes of dispute resolution, including but not
limited to those that are provided for by law."'
Distinguishing formally between ex aequo et bono and equitable decisions in
law is doubtful at best and confusing at worst. Even granting wide latitude to
adjudicators to decide ex aequo et bono may necessarily include reliance on
principles of law, as when legal principles like freedom of contract inform the
usages and practices upon which adjudicators rely. Practical reason may well be
116
determined in law, but not by the a priori determination to exclude law.
The rationale that adjudicators who decide ex aequo et bono engage in
executive lawmaking that is better left to legislatures overstates the division
between making law and applying it." 7 There is ample evidence of gaps in law
being filled by adjudicators who exercise discretion of the widest latitude.
Against this background, circumscribing ex aequo et bono discretion with practical
reason grounded in morality, informed by common sense, and applied in light of
practice and usage is assuredly more evenhanded and transparent than a
comparatively unchecked discretion supposedly exercised under the law of
18
equity.
XI. CONCLUSION
This Article argues for a process of reasoning that is based on morality and
informed by practical reasoning. Conceptual, historical, and pragmatic
considerations alike suggest that adjudicators who resolve disputes ex aequo et
bono inevitably must act within permissible and practical limits. Those limits are
determined functionally, not in terms of strict legal doctrine, but according to a

115

These rules of practice, in turn, are grounded in practical reasonableness. This conception of
practical reasonableness is a tangible attribute of the Modern Law Merchant. See generally Harold
J. Berman and Felix J. Dasser, The 'New' Law Merchant and the 'Old': Sources, Content, and Legitimay,
in Thomas E. Carbonneau, ed, Lex Mercatoria and Arbitration 21 (Juris 1990); A. Claire Cutler,
Private Power and Global Authorit: TransnationalMerchant Law in the Global Political Economy 116
(Cambridge 2003). See also Section VI.
Conciliation is one such alternative process, but it is by no means the only one that might be

116

applied. See John Graham Merrills, International Dispute Settlement 110-111 (Cambridge 2005).
Merrills suggests that conciliation in the Rainbow Warriorcase is comparable to arbitration ex aequo
et bono in the Free Zones case. (New Zealand v France), 20 Rep Intl Arb Awards 217 (1994) (cited in
note 25).
See Section VI.

117

For the argument that deciding ex aequo et bono constitutes executive lawmaking that is ill-fitting
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for courts of law, see Lauterpacht, The Function of Law at 379 (cited in note 17).
118 The distinction between per se reasonableness and practical reasonableness is primarily related to

context. It is in the context of party practice that reasonableness is measured. See Trakman, The
Law Merchant at 23-37, 39-60 (cited in note 46).
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contextual analysis with moral foundations. The permissible reach of ex aequo et
bono depends, not simply on being able to decide outside the law, but upon
reasonable practices, usages and customs that facilitate such decisions. This
approach has the benefit of paying regard to more than legal rights and duties,
including important interests that are not ordinarily protected as rights. It can
also help to salvage party relationships in the face of potentially complex and
protracted disputes." 9
Condemning ex aequo et bono decisions on grounds that they operate not
only outside the law but contrary to it does more than challenge adjudicative
activism. It discourages adjudicators-and the parties who empower themfrom pursuing the fair resolution of disputes when it is most needed: when the
law fails to react adequately to the need for justice. Those who prefer to wait for
the law to respond to injustice and social inequity rather than use ex aequo et bono
decisionmaking may have to wait indefinitely when legal reform is impeded by
political inaction or is fragmentary.

119 On the distinction between "interests falling short of rights" and per se rights, see Leon E.
Trakman, Rights and Reiponsibilidies47-82 (Toronto 1999).
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